ABSTRACT The explosive advancements in mobile Internet and Internet of Things challenge the network capacity and architecture. The ossification of wireless networks hinders the further evolution toward the fifth generation of mobile communication systems. Ultra-dense small cell networks are considered as a feasible way to meet high-capacity demands. Meanwhile, ultra-dense small cell network virtualization also exploits an insightful perspective for the evolution because of its superiority, such as diversity, flexibility, low cost, and scalability. In this paper, we specify the necessity of resource management in virtualized ultra-dense small cell networks through a mapping and management architecture and consider the problem of user-oriented virtual resource management. Then, we model the virtual resource management problem as a hierarchical game and obtain the closed-form solutions for spectrum, power, and price, respectively. Furthermore, we propose a customer-first (CF) algorithm that characterizes the user-oriented service of virtualization, and analyze its convergence. Simulation results present the effectiveness of the proposed CF algorithm.
communication systems [5] . Based on [6] , we define ultradense small cell network virtualization as follows. By virtualization, the physical resources of small base stations can be completely abstracted, pooled, and integrated into many virtual resources, which then can be shared by multiple virtual entities [7] , [8] .
For one thing, the nature of virtualization is a resource sharing technology. Resource virtualization can provide the complete set of resources to serve users flexibly [9] . By integrating the resources of multiple small base stations and converting the service mode from physical to virtual entities, the resources can be shared among different demands. For another, by the decoupling of services and infrastructures, virtualization can provide a platform for the current architecture and implement new technologies, functionalities, and applications. The feasibility of abstracting all available resources of multiple small base stations is studied in [10] .
In virtual networks, resource management plays an important role in boosting network capacity, improving resource utilization, promoting quality of service, and balancing network load, especially in virtualized ultra-dense small cell networks. The cuboid filling model [11] describes the significance of effective resource management schemes intuitively. It means that effective resource management schemes can make the cuboid fully filled and leave resource holes as little as possible. Resource management in virtual networks aims at approaching the perfect matching between resources and demands.
One of the main aims of virtual resource management is to provide user-oriented customized service by abstracting resources and demands. Meanwhile, through forming virtualized ultra-dense small cell networks and converting the architecture from cell-centric to user-centric, user quality of service can also be enhanced [3] . Therefore, it is beneficial to bring virtualization into ultra-dense small cell networks to implement the goal of user-oriented resource management in the fifth-generation of mobile communication systems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II surveys the different works related to virtual resource management and summarizes the contributions of the paper. In section III, we introduce the system model and assumptions, present the proposed two-layer architecture, and specify the necessity of resource management in virtual networks. In section IV, we formulate the resource management problem for different entities. In section V, we provide the closed-form solutions for spectrum, power, price, and analyze the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium solution. Furthermore, we propose a distributed virtual resource management algorithm. Simulation results are presented in section VI. Followed by the conclusions in section VII.
II. RELATED WORK AND CONTRIBUTIONS
In this section, we review works that relate to virtual resource management. We survey the virtual resource management schemes based on optimization theory, cooperative game, and non-cooperative game, and discuss in detail how our proposed scheme based on hierarchical game advances the state of the art. We then summarize and highlight the contributions of this paper.
A. RELATED WORK BASED ON OPTIMIZATION THEORY
So far, there have been many types of research about virtual resource management in the academic community [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] . A survey about the challenges and techniques of resource management in virtualized networks is investigated in [12] . In [13] , scheduling resource blocks among different service providers is studied, and the spectrum demands of providers are determined according to an evaluation mechanism. Moreover, the performance of different schemes with or without virtualization is compared, showing the advantage of virtualization in improving spectrum utilization. An uplink virtual spectrum allocation scheme is presented in [14] , which defines the utilities of users, service providers, and mobile network operators by treating sub-carriers as commodities. Meanwhile, the spectrum demands of users are given, and the price is fixed for all users. Furthermore, the authors in [15] consider a spectrum waste that the demands are calculated at the peak and are fixed in the whole day, and propose an algorithm based on the opportunistic spectrum sharing allocation. Another spectrum waste is considered in [16] , and the primary operators divide their spectrum resource and lease a certain percentage of the spectrum to a given mobile virtual network operator. Hence, resources are wasted if they are neither used by the primary operators nor leased to the mobile virtual network operators. Thus, by setting high percentages of leasing to the mobile virtual network operators, the spectrum resource utilization can be enhanced significantly.
Resource management with virtualization in small cell networks is investigated in [17] and [18] . The authors in [17] introduce a resource negotiation in virtualized LTE-A small cell networks, whose main idea is to reallocate the spectrum resources of two base stations to respond to traffic dynamics. Furthermore, in [18] , a scalable resource negotiation is proposed in LTE-A heterogeneous ultra-dense small cell networks. The authors focus on enabling base stations to interconnect through the logical X2 interface and proceed with reallocating resources cooperatively based on the traffic. The extra signaling overhead is analyzed and calculated. Moreover, the scheme can be applied in multi-service and multi-operator scenarios.
Discussions: The distinctions between our paper and the above paper [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] are mainly in server points. First, different from [13] , using a contract constraint to allocate bandwidth, our paper defines detailed utilities for virtual resource providers (VRPs) and virtual resource requesters (VRRs), and obtains the closed-form solutions for the demands of VRRs to perform on-demand allocation. Second, different from [14] in which the price is fixed for all users, the price for VRRs is adaptive based on the demands of VRRs in our paper. Next, both [15] and [16] study opportunistic spectrum sharing allocation, while we concentrate on the complete matching between resources and demands. Then, [17] and [18] focus on traffic-variational resource allocation and signaling overhead, and we investigate on-demand resource allocation and energy efficient. In addition, based on the above review, we can find out that many virtual resource management schemes are centralized, which are not suitable for large-scale ultradense small cell network scenarios because of high signaling overhead [13] [14] [15] [16] . A few schemes are distributed but only consider spectrum allocation, and the transmission power per resource block is fixed and equal among small base stations [17] , [18] . Moreover, when the scenarios become complex, and the optimal objectives increase, it is difficult to use these schemes to model and describe the complicated interactions. Therefore, a more effective method is necessary for modeling and solving the resource management problem in complex scenarios. Different from [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] , we develop a distributed scheme to perform user-oriented virtual resource management in ultra-dense small cell networks based on game theory.
Game theory has been a promising method for studying resource management problem because of the following advantages.
• First, game theory comprises of abundant game models and is an effective modeling tool to depict and reflect different interactions and constraints among VRRs, VRPs, and both.
• Second, there exists an equilibrium state to achieve the optimal utility.
• Lastly, game theory is appropriate for designing distributed schemes.
B. RELATED WORK BASED ON GAME THEORY
The cooperative game refers that players are cooperative and emphasizes on collective rationality. Spectrum management with virtualization based on different cooperative game models in different networks is studied in [19] , [21] , and [23] . A bankruptcy game model is established in [19] to achieve resource block allocation based on the LTE virtualization architecture proposed in [20] . The cooperative game model is proposed according to a specific predefined contract. The main idea is that the resources are abstracted into a pool and can be shared among mobile virtual operators. A bargaining game model is modeled for bandwidth allocation in Infrastructure as a service (IaaS) data center networks in [21] to achieve fairness. Two main objectives are achieved, including basic bandwidth guarantee based on the bandwidth requirements of virtual machines and residual bandwidth reallocation based on the weights of virtual machines. Moreover, both offline algorithm and online algorithm are developed to optimize Nash bargaining solution. A resource allocation mechanism in IaaS cloud system based on coalition game and the uncertainty of game theory [22] is presented in [23] . The cloud is modeled as a multi-agent set, and different agents have different capabilities. Resource virtualization is done by forming coalitions among multiple agents, and then the virtual resources are allocated to different agents with different tasks. In addition, a power allocation scheme based on the cooperative game in wireless relay virtual networks is proposed in [24] . The authors indicate that combining cooperative communication into virtual networks can promote the network performance toward delay-sensitive multimedia services in mobile wireless networks. The proposed scheme can satisfy the diverse requirements for wireless multimedia services.
The non-cooperative game refers that players are noncooperative and emphasizes on individual rationality. The bandwidth allocation problem is modeled as a noncooperative game in [25] , and Nash equilibrium is obtained in a simple physical topology scenario. In addition, a pricingbased power resource allocation optimization problem in wireless virtual networks is studied in [26] to maximize the energy efficiency of virtual network operators based on noncooperative game. The authors in [27] develop two effective resource management approaches on account of both cooperative and non-cooperative game in cloud federation, which is an emerging technology to improve the utilization ratio of cloud resources. A trust index is created to filter out untrustworthy cloud service providers, and then the resource management approaches are applied to trusted cloud service providers.
Hierarchical game [28] [29] [30] is non-cooperative in nature which has different hierarchies with different utilities. Several resource management with virtualization works have been done using hierarchical game [31] [32] [33] [34] . A bandwidth allocation approach between service providers and infrastructure providers based on two-layer non-cooperative game in cellular networks is proposed in [31] . The first layer is that each infrastructure provider decides whether to accept the request of the service provider. The second layer is that different service providers compete for bandwidth in a shared infrastructure provider. A three-stage Stackelberg model is used to formulate and model the spectrum and power management problem with full-duplex and virtualization in the cellular network [32] . There are four logical roles, including spectrum providers, base station providers, relay providers, and service providers. A hierarchical game approach [33] in softwarized networks is explored to design a distributed network function virtualization system, which is beneficial to telecom operators. The servers' relationship is modeled as non-cooperation game, and the users' relationship is modeled as evolutionary game. A reinforcement learning method is developed to accelerate convergence. Resource allocation in fog computing networks is studied in [34] . Hierarchical game is used to handle the challenges in resource matching and information asymmetry, which takes data service subscribers, fog nodes, and data service operators into account.
Discussions: Several points in our paper are different from the above papers [31] [32] [33] [34] . On the one hand, the idea in [31] is to allocate bandwidth between service providers and infrastructure providers, while our paper jointly considers user-oriented adaptive spectrum allocation, adaptive power allocation, and adaptive price allocation between VRPs and VRRs. Moreover, a distributed and nested scheme is developed in our paper, in which the inner nest aims to perform user-oriented virtual resource blocks (VRBs) and power allocation for given price to maximize each VRR' utility, and the outer nest aims to decide the price for each VRR to maximize the VRP' utility. Further, the interaction between the inner nest and the outer nest finally converges to equilibrium. On the other hand, the power optimization and the bandwidth optimization are separate in [32] , whereas we formulate and analyze VRR utility as a joint optimization function in spectrum and power. In addition, the scenarios in [33] and [34] are softwarized networks and fog computing networks, while our focus is virtualized ultra-dense small cell networks.
C. CONTRIBUTIONS
Although a number of research on resource management in virtualized networks based on game theory have been done, user-oriented virtual resource management based on hierarchical game in ultra-dense small cell networks is still at the beginning level. In this paper, we jointly consider the number of VRBs scheduled to VRRs, the power assigned to VRRs, and the price determined by VRPs. In this way, user quality of service and network performance can be improved. The contributions are summarized as follows.
• A two-layer architecture is presented to map the resource management problem from physical to virtual networks. We specify the necessity of resource management in virtual networks. Virtualized resource management in ultra-dense small cell networks can be decomposed into two entities, VRPs and VRRs. The decomposition enables flexibility in the process of network management.
• Hierarchical game is adapted to depict and reflect the matching interactions between VRPs and VRRs in the proposed two-layer architecture, and also to model the virtualized resource management problem and maximize each entity's revenue. By jointly considering the number of VRBs scheduled to VRRs and the power assigned to VRRs, energy-efficiency and on-demand allocation are taken into account.
• We exploit and explore the nature of virtualization in which resources and demands are aspectant. We further propose a low-complexity distributed customer-first (CF) scheme that characterizes the user-oriented service of virtualization to improve user quality of service, reduce network energy overhead, and promote network resource utilization ratio.
• The existence and uniqueness of sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) and hierarchical Nash equilibrium (HNE) are analyzed and proved for the proposed CF scheme.
• Simulation results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in improving network utility, system rate, network energy efficiency, network resource utilization ratio, and reducing user access-reject probability.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we illustrate the virtual network model and the two-layer architecture in a straightforward and insightful perspective.
A. VIRTUAL NETWORK MODEL
After virtualization, the services are decoupled and the resources are abstracted from infrastructures, respectively. As shown in Fig. 1 , we present a virtual network model including infrastructure layer, pool layer, and service layer. The infrastructure layer has many small base stations, which own physical resource blocks (PRBs). The pool layer consists of a large number of VRBs, which are abstracted from the infrastructure layer and mapped from PRBs. A VRB has the same size as a PRB. VRB is distributed, which means the sub-carriers scheduled to one VRR are scattered on the whole bandwidth. Moreover, more than one VRB can be scheduled to one VRR in each transmission time interval. The service layer is composed of lots of VRRs. These VRRs are contained in different virtual networks based on geographic locations, channel conditions, and service types. There are three virtual networks in the service layer of Fig. 1 By virtualization, some details in the infrastructure layer can be shielded, and the available resources are integrated to be managed uniformly by the pool layer. The service layer can get rid of the management and control of the infrastructure layer, carrying out self-operating and self-management mode to provide user-oriented service. VRRs in the service layer are serviced by leasing resources from the pool layer, and the pool layer obtains revenue by providing resources for the service layer. Therefore, the resource management problem in virtualized ultra-dense small cell networks is mainly to achieve the matching between pool layer and service layer as VOLUME 6, 2018 much as possible, and determine the transmission power. That is, resources can be fully used, and VRRs can be served with satisfaction, which promotes network throughput positively. Fig. 2 depicts the proposed two-layer architecture. Two essential elements, physical networks and virtual networks are included. In physical networks, the components related to resource management are demands and resources, and the resource management problem is the matching of the demands and resources of each small base station. In virtual networks, the components related to resource management are abstracted as VRRs and VRPs. The resource management problem is the matching of the demands and resources of all small base stations, which corresponds to the matching of the service layer and the pool layer in Fig. 1 . We can observe the relationship between two elements in Fig. 2 . The traffic in physical networks can be mapped as the demands of VRRs in virtual networks, which is equivalent to the decoupling of the infrastructure layer and the service layer in Fig. 1 . The resources in physical networks can be virtualized and managed by VRPs in virtual networks, which is equivalent to the abstracting of the infrastructure layer and the pool layer in Fig. 1 . In virtual networks, VRPs own all available resources to provide customized service to VRRs. VRPs are providers, and VRRs are requesters. For example, if we treat VRBs as commodity, VRRs and VRPs play the role of suppliers and customers, respectively, and the related condition is the price provided by VRPs and the demands provided by VRRs. Meanwhile, the transmission power of VRRs should be determined, taking energy efficiency into account.
B. TWO-LAYER ARCHITECTURE

C. CHANNEL MODEL
Suppose that there is one VRP providing service and M VRRs receiving service, ∀m ∈ M. The VRP owns K VRBs. The transmission rate of VRR m can be denoted as 
where p m is the power allocated to VRR m. g m is the link gain of VRR m. N 0 denotes the background noise power.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formulate the user-oriented resource management problem with virtualization as a hierarchical game model in ultra-dense small cell networks. The formulated model takes customized allocation into account. Definition 1: The hierarchical game model is a two-layer game, namely VRP and VRR. In this game, the VRP firstly moves by deciding and broadcasting the price for all VRRs on the basis of VRRs' demands to maximize the VRP' utility, and then VRRs move subsequently by deciding the demands for VRBs based on the communication requirements and the price provided by the VRP, and determining the transmission power to maximize each VRR' utility.
A. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OF VRR
In the VRR layer, VRRs evaluate the demands for VRBs and the power to maximize the utility. We only consider one VRP and focus on the number of VRBs. Inspired by [30] , we adopt the quadratic utility function to formulate the utility of VRR m:
where is related to the revenue in the transmission rate by occupying VRBs. R m is the transmission rate of VRR m.
m is the price of unit bandwidth for VRR m provided by the VRP. b m κ denotes the bandwidth occupied by VRR m.
The motivations for using (3) include the following aspects.
• The utility U VRR m is concave versus the demand b m and the power p m with boundary condition. Thus, it is workable to get the maximum utility of U VRR m .
• The demand function b m is linear versus the price m .
It facilitates the analysis for the VRP. The resource management problem in the VRR layer is to maximize the utility of VRR m while guaranteeing the related constraints as follows:
where γ th is the minimum required SNR for VRRs. Constraint (5) means that each VRR accepts service and the required VRBs are no more than the total number of VRBs. Constraint (6) indicates that the required VRBs of all VRRs do not exceed the total number of VRBs. Constraint (7) sets the minimum threshold γ th and represents that the received SNR of any VRR should be greater than the minimum required SNR. Constraint (8) means that the power of any VRR m should be greater than 0 and the total power of all VRRs is no more than the maximum power p max .
B. PRICING OF VRP
In the VRP layer, the VRP gets revenue by leasing VRBs with appropriate price, which is related to the number of VRBs scheduled to VRRs. We define the utility function of the VRP as
In the same way, the resource management problem in the VRP layer is to maximize the utility of the VRP by the following optimization problem:
The VRP and VRRs are all autonomous decision-makers, who are rational and selfish. Each VRB is exclusively allocated to one VRR and one VRR can use more than one VRB in each transmission time interval.
In summary, we divide the resource management problem into two parts. For VRR m, the demand b m and the power p m are to be optimized. For the VRP, the price m is to be optimized. Both the VRP and VRRs expect to maximize their utilities, respectively.
V. ANALYSIS OF HIERARCHICAL GAME
In this section, we analyze the formulated problem for VRRs and obtain the solution b * m , p * m in subsection A. We also analyze the formulated problem for the VRP and get the solution * m in subsection B. We prove the existence and uniqueness of hierarchical game in subsection C. Finally, the proposed CF algorithm is represented in subsection D.
Definition 2: The solution of the hierarchical game model is named HNE and can be obtained by backward induction method. HNE is composed of b * m , p * m , * m , ∀m ∈ M , where b * m is the optimal number of VRBs scheduled to VRR m and p * m is the optimal power allocated to VRR m. Both are VRR m' strategies to maximize the utility of VRR m . * m is the optimal price for VRR m, which is the VRP' strategy to maximize the utility of the VRP.
A. ANALYSIS OF VRR
The solutions of the formulated problem for VRR m are the demand b m (integer) and the power p m (continuous). The utility function is nonlinear. Hence, the problem is a mixed integer nonlinear programming, which is NP-hard in general. Thus, we transfer (4) into continuous space. The original problem is relaxed as follows:
(12) is a multi-variable problem with continuous space. Given a feasible price for VRR m, we can get the solution of b m and p m based on (1)(2)(3) and (12) . The solving steps are described as follows:
• By the property of Hessian Matrix, we ensure the concavity of U VRR m . Moreover, the constraint set is affine because it consists of linear constraints. Thus, the formulated problem is a convex problem.
• Based on decomposition theory, we convert the multivariable problem into two dependent single-variable problems, i.e., the problem for spectrum adaptation (for b m ) and the problem for power adaptation (for p m ).
• The two single-variable problems can be solved by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions.
• The solutions for the two problems are interactive and the unique SPE in the VRR layer can be found. 
Proof: Hessian Matrix is adopted to guarantee the strict concavity of U VRR m . First, we make a preliminary definition VOLUME 6, 2018
we derive the second-order derivative of U VRR m with respect to b m and p m , respectively.
We can observe A < 0, C < 0. We guarantee the nonnegative definiteness of Hessian Matrix by deriving the sufficient condition of AC − B 2 = It is also known that the affine constraint set is convex set. Notice that since we are facing a convex optimization problem, a local optimum of the problem is also globally optimal. In addition, duality gap is zero under the constraints, so the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient. In the following, we first transform the objective problem into two problems based on decomposition theory, and then use the KKT conditions to solve the two problems, respectively [35] .
1) SPECTRUM ADAPTATION
Based on (12), for a given price m and a feasible power p m , VRR m can evaluate the demand for VRBs by solving the following problem:
The Lagrangian function is as follows:
We know Lagrangian multipliers are nonnegative, i.e., ν m ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0. With the KKT conditions, we have the Lagrange derivation equation with the complementary slackness conditions for VRR m as 
Thus, we have b * m as follows:
From (29), we can observe b * m is related with the power strategy p m and the price strategy m . Given a feasible power p m and price m , we can get the number of VRBs scheduled to VRR m.
Sub-gradient method [35] is used to update the Lagrangian multiplier ν m and λ. Thus, we have
where [] + denotes the projection onto the non-negative area. τ t is an adjustable stepsize, which sensitively affects the convergence. Theoretically, τ t can be constant or diminishing. However, the convergence cannot be guaranteed when using the constant stepsize τ t = τ 1 , τ 1 > 0, which is because the iteration may repeatedly proceed near the closed-form optimal solution. On the contrary, by using the adjustable diminishing stepsize, where τ 1 > 0, lim Furthermore, without loss of generality, we set the iterative terminal conditions using
where ε 1 and ε 2 are any small positive. We can learn that with the convergence settings of (32) and (33) , b m can converge to a steady solution after limited iterations. The detailed user-oriented spectrum adaptation scheme for all VRRs is shown in Algorithm 1, which can be implemented distributively. That is, each VRR updates its own multipliers ν m and λ until convergence.
Up to now, we have gotten the solution for b * m by solving (21) . We should map the solution to the original problem. The common method is to round up to an integer. Thus, the solution is given by the following operation:
2) POWER ADAPTATION Based on (12), for a given price m and the obtained demand b * m , the power of VRR m can be obtained by solving the following problem:
Similar to the problem for spectrum adaptation, we can form the Lagrangian function as follows:
where φ m and π are non-negative Lagrangian multipliers. For each given φ m and π , the power of VRR m can be obtained by solving the following equation.
According to the KKT conditions, we have the following equations:
From ( )ln2
where [] y x is the projection onto the area in [x, y]. Based on (2) and (7), p min m can be obtained as
Moreover, p max should be configured more than > 0 should be guaranteed based on (43).
In the same way, sub-gradient projection method is used for the updating of Lagrangian multipliers:
where [] + denotes the projection onto the non-negative area. η t is an adjustable stepsize. The same as the analysis of spectrum management, in our implementation, we use the diminishing stepsize, and set η t = η 0 t , η 0 = 1, t = 1, 2, .... For the initial multipliers φ m and π , we set φ 1 m ← 10 −3 and π 1 ← 10 5 .
In the same way, we determine the iterative terminal conditions using
where ε 3 and ε 4 are any small positive. With the iterative terminal conditions of (47) and (48), we can learn that p m can converge to a steady solution after limited iterations. The detailed user-oriented power adaptation scheme for all VRRs is shown in Algorithm 2, which can be implemented distributively. That is, each VRR m updates its own multipliers φ m and π until convergence.
According to Algorithm 2, the multipliers φ m and π update accordingly until convergence. Then, the calculated power is taken into account Algorithm 1, and then an updated demand is produced, which will be used in Algorithm 2 again. This procedure will be executed iteratively until convergence, as shown in Algorithm 3.
3) THE EXISTENCE OF SPE
The existence of SPE in the VRR layer is ensured by the following theorem [36] . Update φ m according to (45).
6:
Calculate p m according to (43). 7: end for 8: t ← t + 1. 9: η ← 1/t. 
4) THE UNIQUENESS OF SPE
The uniqueness of SPE is ensured by potential game [37] in the following theorem. The game in the VRR layer can be considered as a potential game if ∀m ∈ M, G(·) is defined as Proof: It is known that the potential function possesses some convenient properties. If player m aims at maximizing G(·), keeping the other players' strategies invariable, the equilibrium point will not be changed [38] . In addition, the potential function G(·) is strictly concave and continuously differentiable in the non-negative area bounded by (18)(19)(20). In consequence, the uniqueness of SPE in the VRR layer is ensured.
B. ANALYSIS OF VRP
To maximize the total revenue, the VRP needs to decide the optimal price for VRRs based on the scheduled VRBs. we substitute (29) into (9) and get
(51)
Theorem 4:
The utility U VRP is strictly concave, and the VRP has the maximum revenue when
Proof: We derive the second-order derivative of U VRP versus m and get
Thus, the utility is strictly concave. Given
, by which the VRP can get the maximum revenue.
It can be observed that the optimal price strategy of the VRP is related to the spectrum strategy and power strategy of VRRs.
Theorem 5: There exists only one SPE ( * m ) in the VRP layer if ∀m ∈ M: the set ( m ) is a nonempty compact set, and the utility function U VRP is continuous on ( m ) and strictly concave on ( m ). That is, ( m ) satisfies ( * m ) = arg max * m U VRP .
Proof:
The constraint set is affine as it consists of linear constrains. Thus, it is a convex and compact set. We can also know that the utility is continuous on ( m ). Furthermore, the strict concavity of U VRP with respect to ( m ) is proved and guaranteed in Theorem 4. Therefore, only one SPE exists. Combining Theorem 2, Theorem 3, and Theorem 5, we know that (b * m , p * m , ∀m ∈ M) and ( * m , ∀m ∈ M) are unique SPEs for each layer. Moreover, each SPE is Nash equilibrium [27] , [32] . Therefore, there is a unique HNE
C. THE EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF HNE
The details of the proposed CF Algorithm is presented in Algorithm 4. Due to the leading role of the VRP, the Algorithm will converge to HNE if for ∀m ∈ M, the price satisfies ≤ ε 5 . Meanwhile, we can observe the scheme is distributed not only in the VRP layer and the VRR layer but also within the VRR layer. This is because the VRP and VRRs are only for maximizing their own utilities. Moreover, the VRP and VRRs can termly update the CF scheme if the demand and price change. The convergence and effectiveness of the proposed CF Algorithm are verified in section VI.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, the convergence and effectiveness of the proposed CF Algorithm are demonstrated by simulation results. The simulation parameters are described as follows.
We consider a hexagon area which is covered by one VRP and some VRRs. The total number of VRBs is 100, which are abstracted from all small base stations. The size of each VRB is 180 kHz. VRRs are distributed randomly within the hexagon area. The maximal power of each small base station is set to 30 dBm. The background noise power N 0 is set to −100 dBm. The path loss model is denoted as PL = 140.7 + 36.7log 10 (R[km] ). The small-scale fading is modeled as Rayleigh random variables. The minimum required SNR is set to 5. is 100. The basic configurations are based on 3GPP TR36.814. Each VRR can be serviced by more than one VRB and each VRB can be used to serve only one VRR. Meanwhile, it is known that each small base station can only provide service for a certain number of VRRs if without virtualization, while the management and the service are more flexible and beneficial if with virtualization.
A. CONVERGENCE
For illustrative purposes, we consider a scenario with 4 VRRs. Fig. 3 verifies the convergence of the proposed CF scheme, including the convergence of user-oriented spectrum adaptive algorithm in Fig. 3(a) , the convergence of user-oriented power adaptive algorithm in Fig. 3(b) , and the convergence of price adaptive algorithm in Fig. 3(c) . In Fig. 3(a) , the X-axis is the number of iterations, and the Y-axis is demand for each VRR. Similarly to Fig. 3(b) and (c), the X-axis is the number of iterations, and the Y-axis is power and price for each VRR, respectively. We can see that demand, power, and price for each VRR converge quickly with the increasing number of iterations. It can be observed that the curves start to converge at the first iteration and reach steady state at the second iteration. In addition, we can also see that the demands are different for different VRRs and the corresponding price provided by the VRP is also different. Furthermore, it can be seen that when the demands of VRRs are equal (such as VRR 1, VRR 2, and VRR 4 in Fig. 3(a) ), the prices are also equal (such as VRR 1, VRR 2, and VRR 4 in Fig. 3(c) ). Moreover, the higher the demands are (such as VRR 3 and VRR 4 in Fig. 3(a) ), the higher the corresponding prices are (such as VRR 3 and VRR 4 in Fig. 3(c) ), which is due to the linear relation between the price and the demand.
Further, the complexity of the proposed CF scheme is evaluated in Fig. 4 . The X-axis is the different number of VRRs, and the Y-axis is the execution time of CF scheme. The unit of time is second (s). The complexity is counted under the condition that the iterations is 9 and the statistic times is 20. We can see that the rise is gently with the increasing number of VRRs. When the number of VRRs is 4, the algorithm complexity is 13s. When the number of VRRs is 36, the algorithm complexity is 26s. Thus, the number of VRRs increases 8-fold while the complexity only increases 1-fold. Therefore, the proposed CF scheme is low-complexity. 
B. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
We show performance curves from the following aspects:
• Comparison of the total utility of VRRs with and without virtualization in Fig. 5 .
• Comparison of the utility of the VRP with and without virtualization in Fig. 6 .
• Comparison of the average energy efficiency in the whole networks for different schemes in Fig. 7 .
• Comparison of the system rate with and without virtualization in Fig. 8 .
• Comparison of the resource utilization ratio with and without virtualization in Fig. 9 .
• Comparison of the access-reject probability of VRRs with and without virtualization in Fig. 10 . The total utility of VRRs is illustrated in Fig. 5 . We compare the performance of the CF scheme with the classical scheme without virtualization. The classical scheme is with fixed spectrum-allocation, average power-allocation, and average price-allocation. More specifically, each small base station has 50 VRBs, and the power is 30 dBm. Each VRR get 3 VRBs, and each small base station can serve 16 VRRs at most. The power is 0.02*3, and the price adopts the statistical average of CF algorithm. It is easy to understand that the total utility of VRRs increases steadily with the growth of VRRs because more VRRs will bring more revenue. We can also observe that the CF scheme with virtualization always has an advantage over the classical scheme without virtualization. When the number of users is 44, the CF scheme with virtualization achieves the utility improvement of almost 22% than the classical scheme without virtualization. The reason is that VRRs can receive better quality of service and connect to a better condition of service with customized and on-demand resource allocation. That is, a higher degree of freedom of resource allocation is realized. Moreover, another reason is that the lower resource price is consumed for VRRs. More interestingly, when the network scale is extended through the number of VRRs, the utility of VRRs still increases with respect to the number of VRRs. Thus, the proposed CF scheme is especially suited to the network, which is large-scale or ultra-dense.
We also evaluate the total utility of the VRP versus the number of VRRs in Fig. 6 . The classical scheme is same as the one in Fig. 5 . With the growth of VRRs, the utility of the VRP increases gradually because VRRs consume more resources. We can see that the utility of the CF scheme is always higher than the utility of the classical scheme. Meanwhile, when the number of VRRs is greater than 32, the superiority of the CF scheme is more obvious than the classical scheme. The reason is that more resources are leased in case of virtualization, thus, more revenues are obtained. Therefore, similarly to Fig. 5 , the proposed CF scheme is applicable to the large-scale or ultra-dense networks.
We evaluate the performance of the CF scheme in terms of the average energy efficiency of the whole networks in Fig. 7 . We can see that the CF scheme outperforms the classical scheme that is same as the one in Fig. 5 . This is because the energy efficiency has been taken into account in the utility as an optimal objective. It can also be observed that the curve shows a descending tendency with the number of VRRs, which can be explained by the different growth rates in the average energy efficiency and the number of VRRs. Even so, when the number of users is 36, 3-fold energy efficiency improvement is achieved compared to the classical scheme.
We also evaluate the system rate with the different number of VRRs in Fig. 8 . The classical scheme for fixed spectrumallocation and average power-allocation is same as the one in Fig. 5 . It shows that the curves rise with the growth of VRRs because of the multi-connectivity gain. Moreover, the CF scheme has higher rate than the classical scheme. The reason is that more VRRs are served with the same amount of resources by virtualization and higher quality of service are guaranteed by on-demand allocation. It can also be observed that the performance improvement with a large number of VRRs is higher than the one with a small amount of VRRs. When the number of users is 8, the system rate with the CF scheme is 2 Kbps higher than the one with the classical scheme. When the number of users is 36, the system rate with the CF scheme is 10 Kbps higher than the one with the classical scheme.
As shown in Fig. 9 , the resource utilization ratio using different schemes with and without virtualization is compared. The classical scheme adopts on-demand spectrumallocation. Each small base station has 50 VRBs, therefore the total demands of VRRs served by an small base station cannot exceed 50 if without virtualization. The resource utilization ratio increases with the growth of VRRs, which is because more resources are consumed. We can observe that the resource utilization ratio is equal when the number of users is smaller than 32. The reason is that the resources are enough to meet VRRs' demands. Furthermore, it can be observed that the resource utilization ratio using the CF scheme outperforms the one using the classical scheme when the number of VRRs is larger than 32. The reason is that the comparison scheme adopts the same spectrum allocation algorithm as the CF scheme but without using virtualization, which limits the flexibility of resource allocation and each small base station is only able to provide service for a certain number of VRRs. In other words, when the number of VRRs becomes large, the demands for resources become more, which may result in some VRRs not being served due to the insufficient resources if without virtualization. Thus, the residual resources are wasted and the resource utilization ratio is low. On the contrary, virtualization can integrate resources among multiple small base stations, which reduces the resource waste and improves the resource utilization ratio. We can calculate the promotion of the resource utilization ratio is about 4% when the number of VRRs is 40.
Further, we represent the access-reject probability with and without virtualization in Fig. 10 . The classic scheme for spectrum-allocation is same as the scheme in Fig. 8 . The access-reject probability refers that the ratio of VRRs that cannot be served due to the limited resources. We can see that for both CF scheme and classical scheme, the accessreject probability is zero when the number of VRRs is not larger than 28, which is because the resources are adequate to satisfy the demands. It can be seen that when the number of VRRs is 32, the access-reject probability begins to increase for the classical scheme while is still zero for the CF scheme, which is because the resources of some small base stations are inadequate to meet VRRs' demands if without virtualization. That is, by integrating resources with virtualization, more VRRs can receive service at the same time. Moreover, we can see that when the number of VRRs is more than 32, the access-reject probability increases with the increasing VRRs for both CF scheme and classical scheme. With the growth of VRRs, the tendency is upward because of the inadequate resources and the added traffic. However, the accessreject probability with virtualization is always lower than the one without virtualization, and the superiority is even more obvious when the number of VRRs is large. This is because the integrating and sharing characteristics of virtualization, which means that the same amount of resources is able to meet more VRRs demands. It can be calculated that the access-reject probability of the CF scheme is 18% less than the one of the classical scheme when the number of VRRs is 40. That is, the same resources can serve 7 people more with the CF scheme. Therefore, combining with the Fig. 8 , a conclusion can be obtained that the CF scheme can be applied in the ultra-dense large-connection scenario.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the user-oriented resource management problem with virtualization in ultra-dense small cell networks based on hierarchical game. We proposed a two-layer architecture specifying the necessity of resource management from physical networks to virtual networks. In virtual networks, there exist two components: VRPs and VRRs. We formulated the problem as a hierarchical game to maximize the utilities of both the VRP and VRRs. In the VRP layer, the VRP decides and broadcasts the price for VRRs based on demands. In the VRR layer, VRRs evaluate the demands for VRBs based on the communication requirements and the price provided by the VRP, and determine the transmission power. We formulated the utility of VRRs as a joint optimization function in spectrum and power. To solve the problem efficiently, we used decomposition method and standard convex optimization method to obtain the closedform solutions for spectrum, power, and price, respectively. Most importantly, we proposed a low-complexity CF algorithm and HNE was found. Simulation results confirmed the convergence and effectiveness of the proposed CF algorithm. He is a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, the Canadian Academy of Engineering, and the Engineering Institute of Canada. He is an Editor of the IEEE JSAC-SGCN, the IEEE WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS LETTERS, and several other journals. VOLUME 6, 2018 
